This paper aims at analysing the performances of the EU member states in the Europe 2020
Introduction
The Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the European Union (EU) was launched by the European Commission (EC) in March 2010 and approved by the Heads of States and Governments of the twenty-seven member states of the EU in June 2010. The new strategy is the result of a political decision intended to address the main structural challenges the EU faces and can be considered as the successor of the Lisbon strategy. It represents more a political priority than an analytical exercise, so the aim of this paper will be to understand the main factors of success in this strategy, more than to justify the choice of these priorities.
The Commission's proposal for a 10-year development strategy aims at moving out of the crisis, avoiding "the reflex to try to return to the pre-crisis situation" and changing the model of development. Three priorities were identified as main pillars of this strategy: Smart growthdeveloping an economy based on knowledge and innovation; Sustainable growth -promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy; Inclusive growth -fostering a high-employment economy delivering economic, social and territorial cohesion (European Commission, 2010) .
The Europe 2020 strategy sets out concrete targets to be achieved within the next decade in areas such as employment, education, energy use and innovation in order to overcome the impact of the financial crisis and promote economic growth. The key deliveries for the Europe 2020 Strategy at national level are the so-called "National Reform Programmes" (NRPs), which are to be presented by the national governments in April of each year, along with the stability and convergence programmes 2 . NRPs contain national targets relating to EU-wide headline targets and explain how governments intend to meet them and overcome obstacles to growth. They also set out what measures will be taken, when, by whom and with what budget implications.
In this framework, new policy instruments for performance benchmarking (Huggins, 2010) , such as composite indicators specifically developed for the Europe 2020 Strategy (Pasimeni, 2011) , can be useful for the quantification, measurement, monitoring and evaluation of the strategy. The objective is to avoid some weaknesses of the Lisbon strategy, the growth strategy for the European Union in the last decade (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , whose weaknesses have been related (Saltelli et al, 2011) to the inappropriate use of statistical indicators, not used in the context of an advocacy programme in support of the EU policy. This paper builds on the index developed in Pasimeni (2011) to quantify, measure and monitor the progress achieved by the twenty-seven member states of the EU towards the achievements of the objectives set by the new strategy and aims at identifying the critical factors of success for this strategy. The structure of the index is maintained, some elements of its calculation are modified, in order to ensure a better consistency over time, and the analysis is enhanced covering seven years instead of three. The index is then be used to identify the main factors which determine the differences in performances among countries. Section 2 of the paper presents the methodology used; section 3 presents an analysis of its external validity; section 4 applies the new tool to examine the critical factors affecting the strategy; section 5 focuses on the role of institutions; and finally section 6 concludes.
The index
The "Europe 2020 Index", as proposed in Pasimeni (2011) , is based on three thematic subindices representing the three dimensions of growth identified as main pillars of the strategy. These in turn are built on a set of eight indicators agreed and approved by the Heads of States and Governments of the twenty-seven member states of the EU. These indicators are calculated at national level by Eurostat 3 , some of them have quite long time series available, since the early nineties, but others only cover a more limited time span. This paper uses a more complete set of data, allowing the construction of the index for seven instead of three years. The eight official indicators to monitor the Europe 2020 strategy are: The data used are extracted by Eurostat and at the moment the largest common period for which all of them are available is from 2003 to 2009, being the shortest time series for the RNEW indicator. Table 1 provides the summary statistics for these indicators 4 showing the mean over the available time periods, the standard deviation, minimum and maximum values. The normalisation method for the eight indicators remains the same, by applying:
where i is the indicator, c the country, and max k and min k are the maximum and minimum values of that indicator across the whole period available. These values, however, are different from the previous version of the index: the choice has been made to used absolute higher and lower bounds among the data available for all the countries, even non EU, across the full time series.
The comparability over time of the index, across many years, will be easier and more "sustainable", reducing the probability that some value for EU countries reaches the absolute historical maximum or minimum. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the normalised values, presenting the mean over the available time periods, the standard deviation, minimum and maximum values: Three thematic indices can be created by grouping these indicators, reflecting the three main pillars of the Europe 2020 strategy: the Smart Growth Index (SMGI), the Sustainable Growth Index (SUGI), and the Inclusive Growth Index (INGI), which in turn form the Europe 2020 Index. The normalised indicators are aggregated with a geometric mean using equal weights (Ebert and Welsch, 2004; OECD, 2008) , as in Pasimeni (2011) th to 7 th ). In most of the cases we observe an increase in absolute values of the index for each country, only in very few cases the performance lowers. The two most significant cases of reduction in the value of the index are observed for Romania and Latvia in the year 2009 compared to 2008: the first sees a reduction of 0.011 points, the second, even bigger, of 0.039 points.
This might be an expected result, due to the effects of the crisis on the policies put in place, and by taking a closer look at the three components of the strategy, we can disaggregate this effect. In both cases the decrease is explained by the strong deterioration of their performances in the inclusive dimension (INGI) and in the smart growth one (SMGI), while at the same time their sustainable growth index (SUGI) was still improving.
This Index offers an opportunity to perform quantitative assessments of the Europe 2020 Strategy, and might be used to explore which factors are more decisive for its improvement. The next section compares this measure with the other main indices available in the literature, analysing different facets of development. We then study the correlation between this measure of the strategy and the main indicators of economic development or the main institutional dimensions of good governance, to assess their relative relevance.
External validity of the index
In this section the index is compared to other selected indices available in the literature, which rank countries according to their performance in a certain dimension. In particular the section extends the analysis of globalisation and competitiveness in relation to the Europe 2020 Strategy, in order to understand to what extent these are positive factors for the strategy, and how this relation evolves over time.
The KOF Index of Globalisation (Dreher 2006 , Dreher et al. 2008 ) is a composite index, based on the thematic sub-indices of economic, social and political globalisation, which aims to measure the levels of globalisation of more than 190 countries 5 . The data available for this composite index only cover the period until 2008, and we can observe that the correlation between the Europe 2020 Index and each of the three dimensions of globalisation is positive, but moderate.
What is extremely relevant in this comparison is that the correlation between the Europe 2020 performance, as measured by the Index, and the level of globalisation, as measured by the KOF one, is clearly decreasing every year. This holds true for each one of the specific sub-indices composing the Globalisation Index, as shown in Figure The graph shows that while in 2003 the two performances were highly correlated (r=.697; ρ=.769), implying that more "globalised" member states clearly had better performance in those dimensions which now form the Europe 2020 Strategy, this is less and less valid in 2008 (r=.479; ρ=.527). The explanation for this clear tendency might be that even though the twenty-seven member states of the EU constitute a quite homogeneous group of countries with very similar degrees of social, political and economic globalisation, for those which joined the EU only in 2004 (and 2007) this might have been taken some time.
The declining relevance of the differences in the degree of openness (as measured by the Globalisation Index) could reflect the process of integration within the EU. In other words, once the twenty-seven member states share the same broad economic, political and social aquis as members of the EU, they do not differ much from each other in terms of openness to the rest of the world. It will be interesting to see if this tendency continues over the following years.
The World Economic Forum publishes each year a Global Competitiveness Report, in which 133 economies are ranked according to a Global Competitiveness Index (GPI) 6 , which tries to measure the set of institutions, policies and factors that set the sustainable current and mediumterm levels of economic prosperity, in order to assess "the ability of countries to provide high levels of prosperity to their citizens. This in turn depends on how productively a country uses available resources" (Schwab et al. 2010 ).
The advantage of this index as a good test for the Europe 2020 Index is that it includes a very large number of indicators, classified by thematic areas (pillars), from institutions, infrastructures, education, to macroeconomic environment, health, markets functioning, technology and innovation, and aggregated with a linear method. Its comprehensiveness makes it a good benchmark for the Europe 2020 Index. The Global Competitiveness Index is strongly correlated with the Europe 2020 one (ρ=.749), this correlation also has a very high degree of linearity (r=.801), and is robust (significance level = 99.9%). These results suggest that the Europe 2020 strategy, as it has been presented and according to the indicators chosen for its quantification, measurement and monitoring, is perfectly consistent with the overall concept of competitiveness, as defined by the Global Competitiveness Index, and that competitiveness is one of the key factors of success in the strategy.
Critical factors affecting the Europe 2020 strategy
This section tries to identify those factors which are more decisive for the Europe 2020 Strategy, factors that can explain the differences in performances of the member states, as measured by the Europe 2020 Index. In order to do this, the main macroeconomic indicators together with other institutional factors relevant for development, proposed in the literature, are compared to the Index.
The main macroeconomic indicators of the public accounts are analysed to understand how relevant they are for the performance of the member states in the Europe 2020 Strategy. The analysis performed here will try to shed some light on whether having a sound macroeconomic and fiscal profile guarantees better performance in the Europe 2020 strategy.
The Europe 2020 index is positively related to good economic performance, as measured by GDP per capita. This correlation however is not very strong. Levels of GDP, measured in purchasing power standards, compared to the average for the twenty-seven member states of the EU, are positively correlated to the Europe 2020 Index (Pearson's = .352, Spearman's = .598). These values tell us that there is a positive correlation, but its linearity is not so strong. The analysis of the relationship between GDP growth and levels of the Europe 2020 Index show no correlation at all (r= -.168; ρ= -.252) and this is valid across the whole time series.
In the framework of the European Monetary Union, member states agreed to avoid excessive budgetary deficits. Under the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, they agreed to respect two criteria: a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%, and a deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3%. If a country exceeds the deficit ceiling the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) is triggered at EU level. However, when the excess of the government deficit over the 3% threshold is considered temporary, no sanction is applied. The measure of government deficit is a measure of the difference between the revenue and the expenditure of the general government sector. This indicator shows a positive correlation with the Europe 2020 Index (r= .379; ρ= .384), which is, however, very limited.
Other factors, however, could better explain the differences in performances of the member states in the Europe 2020 Strategy, as measured by our Index. Institutions, in the sense of "humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions" (North, 1991) , are often recognised as important conditions for development. This applies to both formal and informal institutional settings. Being Europe 2020 a broad strategy for development, it seems reasonable to test whether and to what extent different measures of governance available in the economic literature can explain the critical factors for such a strategy to be successful.
In this section the main indicators and indices of good governance available in the literature, as measures of formal institution, are analysed to understand whether and to what extent they represent necessary preconditions for the Europe 2020 strategy to be successful. Then the role of social capital, as example of informal institutions, is also analysed.
The World Bank has developed the Worldwide Governance Indicators project (Kaufmann et al, 2010) In some cases this correlation is extremely strong, linear and robust. Government effectiveness, Control of corruption and Rule of Law are the dimensions which best explain the Europe 2020 Index, much better than the public accounts indicators. The linear regressions show a strong correlation in both cases, even stronger if measured by the Spearman's coefficient, a non-parametric coefficient, which is less sensitive about the outliers (in these cases Malta and Cyprus). In all three cases the statistical tests of significance show a probability of type-one error below 0.1%, meaning a significance level of 99.9% for these correlations.
The first indicator has been built to measure perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, and to which the state mainly serves elites and private interests. The Control of Corruption one tries to capture the perception of the quality of public services, of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The latter captures perceptions of the extent to which people have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
The strict correlation between these measures and the Europe 2020 Index is extremely interesting and very much in line with the hypothesis of good governance as the main pre-requisite for an effective implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy. This factor is often underestimated in developed countries, but these results show how it makes the difference when it comes to assessing a broad development strategy which goes beyond the simple measures of economic growth.
Figure 6: Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness' correlations with Europe 2020
Another well-known measure of corruption can be tested in order to corroborate how relevant good governance is, and in particular the control of corruption, as a decisive factor in deploying successful public policies even in more developed countries. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published by Transparency International (2010) each year since 1995, ranks the countries of the world according to "the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians". This index is based on a linear aggregation method of several indicators. The organization defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain". It gives a comprehensive picture of corruption in the countries analysed by combining a number of different indicators of corruption into one index, and is a "positive" index, i.e. a higher score means less corruption.
The analysis of correlations shows that countries with a higher Europe 2020 Index are precisely those with a higher CPI, i.e. with lower levels of corruption. Figure 7 shows this positive and very strong correlation (Pearson = .782; Spearman = .840; significance: 99.9%) of the Index with the CPI, suggesting that levels of corruption in a country is a good predictor of the capacity of this country to achieve the Europe 2020 objectives and is indeed a relevant threaten to the strategy. It had already been demonstrated that levels of corruption are negatively correlated with levels of investments and expenditures on education (Mauro, 1995) and that corruption opportunities may be less abundant on education than on other components of government expenditure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) , but this strong correlation between the Europe 2020 Index and the CPI is particularly important, since it substantiates the idea that good governance may determine the overall success of such a broad development strategy.
These results suggest that EU countries must constantly keep under control the levels of corruption, not just for the seek of ethical and moral objectives, but also for the attainment of their development objectives. We can observe how institutional factors of good governance, like levels of corruption, rule of law and effectiveness of governments are more decisive than the traditional macroeconomic indicators of public finance to achieve the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, as shown in Figure 8 . This result is quite relevant from a policy perspective, especially taking into account the current emphasis on public accounts as the main criteria to define structural reforms in the EU. If institutional factors are as relevant as fiscal consolidation for the pursuing of the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, or even more as these results suggest, then the agenda for structural reforms might be enhanced, including a broader focus on institutions.
Institutions and the Europe 2020 strategy
The analysis presented in the previous section highlights the role of formal institutions, as measured by the indicators of good governance, for the achievement of the Europe 2020 objectives. Corruption, in particular, seems to be the single most important factor. This result has been corroborated by two different measures, namely the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator, and the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.
The literature on corruption and on its relation with development (Rose-Ackerman, 1975) has emphasised several channels trough which it has adverse effects on economic growth (Bardhan, 1997) , on investments (Mauro, 1995) , on inequalities and poverty (Gupta et al, 2001 ), on education (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) , explaining the incentive structure that may favour the diffusion of corrupted actions in the society. Corruption has negative effects on the effectiveness and on the efficiency of the use of the resources deployed to foster economic development; it acts as a clamp on the whole economic system and may determine the success or failure of development strategies, such as the Europe 2020 one.
There is a certain current of thought among economists, called "free-market libertarians" by Rose-Ackerman (2010) , which has tried to associate the levels of corruption with the size of governments (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Becker, 1995; Banerjee, 1997; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) . In Becker's (1995) words "if you want to cut corruption, cut governments", because bigger governments raise the opportunities for corruption. According to Alesina and Angeletos (2005) "the larger the resources controlled by the government, or the more extensive the regulation of the market, the larger the scope for corruption and rent seeking", and on this basis they claim that "government intervention fosters corruption and injustice". Also Banerjee (1997) explicitly models bureaucracy and corruption, reaching the conclusion that "a significant part of what we see as government failures may exist even when a government has the best of intentions and is subject to no special sociological constraints".
For the purposes of this analysis, it can be interesting to see whether the strict correlation between the Europe 2020 Index and the control of corruption also implies a negative correlation with the size of the government in the member states, as suggested by the "free-market libertarians" hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, control of corruption and the CPI, which are "positive" measures of corruption (the higher the value, the lower the corruption level) should have a negative correlation with the size of government, in the twenty-seven member states. Consequently, the Europe 2020 Index should also be negatively correlated with the same indicator of size of government.
The OLS regression analyses seem to contradict this hypothesis, showing instead a positive correlation. This correlation is also moderately strong, both in the case of Control of Corruption (r = .600; ρ = .585), and for the Corruption Perception Index (r = .589; ρ = .576). This has also been valid over the previous years: These results suggest that in the European Union those countries where the size of the government is bigger, meaning that general government expenditures have a higher share on GDP, tend to be those with a better control over corruption. This should imply a positive correlation between the Europe 2020 Index and the size of government, which is in fact confirmed by the following Figure: The Europe 2020 Index is not negatively correlated with the size of government; on the contrary the relation is quite positive. The hypothesis of size government being the main incentive for corruption seems not to hold true in the case of the EU, even though government expenditures are not exempt from mismanagement and misbehaviours. The point is that limiting the scope of the problem to a merely quantitative account of the opportunities for corruption, instead of focussing on the quality and capacity of the state intervention and on the necessary accountability mechanisms, might be superficial. The analysis of the impact of corruption on the economy and of its underlying causes should probably be more accurate.
Informal institutional factors can further contribute to shed some light on the performances of EU countries in the Europe 2020 Strategy, as measured by the Europe 2020 Index. The role of social capital has been considered for this analysis. In the most recent economic literature on economic development the notion of social capital is increasingly emphasised as a factor determining economic performances. Just like other forms of capital (physical, financial, human) it is considered a facilitator for the economic activities, contributing at both microeconomic level (with its ability to improve market functioning) and macroeconomic level (affecting the global organisation of production). To some extent, it has become a concept for defining 'the missing ingredient' in successful practice that economics cannot explain (Landabaso et al, 2007) .
Most of the definitions of social capital highlight components like norms, values, voice, feelings of trust, solidarity and reciprocity, which enable better social interactions, coordination, networking and organisational capacity that in turn act as facilitators of the economic activity. It is a sociological and psychological concept having certain relevance for economic development. One of the most common proxies for social capital is a measure of generalised trust, provided by the World Value Survey indicator "most people can be trusted" (Inglehart et al, 2011 ). This indicator is available for the twenty-seven member states of the EU, across different periods.
The OLS regression shows one of the strongest linear correlation with the Europe 2020 Index (Pearson = .750; Spearman = .637; significance: 99.9%), as in Figure 11 . The linear regression coefficient (Pearson) is one of the highest found in the analysis, highlighting the role of social capital as determinant for the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
Conclusions
This paper has developed a study of the Europe 2020 Strategy by improving the Europe 2020 Index and applying it to the analysis of the critical factors of success for the strategy. The external analysis of the index confirms that competitiveness is an important element of the strategy, as the extremely strong correlation with the Global Competitiveness Index indicates. Levels of globalisation, instead, are decreasingly relevant in explaining the differences among the member states of the EU, suggesting that a certain convergence is taking place in the degree of openness.
The analysis shows that institutional factors are more decisive to achieve the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy than macroeconomic indicators of public accounts, such as GDP growth, levels of government debt and deficit. This is true for formal institutional factors of good governance, such as levels of corruption, rule of law and effectiveness of governments, as well as for informal institutions, such as social capital.
This result is relevant from a policy perspective, due to the present emphasis on public accounts as the main criteria to define structural reforms in the EU. If institutional factors are as relevant as fiscal consolidation for the pursuing of the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, or even more relevant, as these results suggest, then the agenda for structural reforms could be enhanced, including a broader focus on institutions.
The costs of corruption are often underestimated in developed countries, but these results show that they must constantly be kept under control since they are determinant for the implementation of development policies in the member states of the EU. The analysis of the impact of corruption on the economy and of its underlying causes should probably be more accurate. Corruption has negative impacts on the effectiveness and on the efficiency of the use of the resources deployed to foster economic development; it acts as a clamp on the whole economic system and may determine the success or failure of development strategies, such as the Europe 2020 one.
The analysis of informal institutions suggests that social capital has indeed a relevant role for this strategy, substantiating what has often been argued in the recent economic literature, that it is a critical factor of success for development.
The paper also aims to create basis for further research. In particular, further analysis could be conducted, if we were able to gather data at regional level for the eight indicators composing the index. This could provide us with more meaningful and robust insights on the key success factors of the Europe 2020 Strategy.
